Van Til’s Two-Adam Structure and Apologetics: A Defense of Van Til Against William D. Dennison

(1) Summary of Dennison’s Critique

William D. Dennison has published a critique regarding Van Til’s apologetic method, namely, that it is biblically-theologically lacking in its rationale of the antithesis, and that if he had only integrated Vos’s two-age eschatology into his understanding of the nature of the relationship between the unbeliever and God, he would not have abstracted the antithesis, and fell, as he did, into the rationalistic, abstractionist tendencies of his Old Princetonean ancestors.[1] Dennison argues,

Van Til simply fails to apply his concept of analogy to the historical process of God’s revelation, and therefore, we can understand why he fails to correct the order of the traditional topics of systematics. For our theological task to be truly analogical, it must be organized in submission to God’s organic plan of redemption revealed to us in His word. In other words, the ordo salutis is subordinate to the historia salutis.[2]

Furthermore, Dennison argues,

Van Til falls into…the ‘tendency to abstraction,’ or more pointedly a ‘tendency to dehistoricize, the tendency to arrive at ‘timeless formulations’ in the sense of topically oriented statements which do not adequately reflect the fact that God’s self-revelation (verbal communication) is an integral part of the totality of his concrete activity in history as sovereign creator and redeemer.[3]

For Van Til, the rationale for the notion of history having any meaning whatsoever flows from the relationship between the eternal mind of God in its economic participation in the pactum salutis and the historical progression of history as it unfolds in what Van Til explicitly states is a two-Adam structure of understanding history.[4]

Dennison makes his case against this understanding of Van Til from Van Til’s articulation of his theological method, in which he describes eschatology as the doctrine of the future. Dennison dislikes this notion, because, as a Th.M student writing this thesis, his recent encounter with the sound bite “eschatology precedes soteriology” has apparently given him insight deeper into the meta-structure of Scripture than Van Til could have ever fathomed. Dennison says regarding a brief sentence in Van Til regarding the relationship between biblical theology and systematic theology, “To my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive statement in Van Til’s writings concerning the relationship of biblical theology to systematic theology.”[5]

Dennison also summarizes Van Til’s understanding of God’s analytic knowledge of himself as prescriptive for our understanding of his revelation. However, Dennison does not cite one example in which Van Til negates the role of historical progress in God’s revelation or its necessity for understanding the system of truth set forth in Scripture. Since there are therefore no texts in the work of Van Til which Dennison brings to the debate, it is appropriate for the apologist sympathetic to Van Til’s rationale to bring whatever text might disprove Dennison’s contention.

What, I wonder, are Dennison’s sources for his understanding of eschatology which gives him this insight into Van Til’s theological shortcoming? He says in his introduction, “It is imperative, in my estimation, that the Reformed community reflect fruitfully upon the Vos-Ridderbos-Gaffin interpretation of St. Paul, for a restatement of Reformed theological formulations.”[6] The task, then, in order to vindicate Van Til’s rationale for the ultimate ethical antithesis, is to see if he anywhere qualifies his conception of antithesis with the criteria Dennison sets forth.

(2) Van Til Wrote These Things for Our Instruction

Does Van Til use Vos? This may seem clear, for he references Vos quite often; but did he, as Dennison claims he does not, yet should have, “reflect fruitfully upon the Vos-Ridderbos-Gaffin interpretation of St. Paul, for a restatement of Reformed theological formulations?” Perhaps we shall consider each of these names one at a time.

Richard Gaffin was a student of Van Til, and said regarding Van Til’s concession to his critics that his theological and apologetic work was not biblically-theologically qualified enough, “In my view Van Til was too hard on himself and conceded too much to his critics. Many of them have not read him as carefully as they might.”[7] Moreover, Gaffin asserts, “He was…not only knowledgeable in but thoroughly committed to the kind of biblical theology fathered by…Geerhardus Vos. A reflective reading of Van Til shows a mind (and heart) thoroughly permeated by Scripture.”[8] Finally, in his concluding footnote, Gaffin says, “But I am convinced that…Reformed anthropology and soteriology…control Van Til’s epistemology and apologetics.”[9]

If Dennison is correct in presenting Gaffin’s understanding of Reformed soteriology as essentially eschatological, then Gaffin’s last statement directly contradicts Dennison’s thesis that Van Til is “unlike” Gaffin in his eschatology, and therefore his transcendental method.[10] Van Til himself writes to Gaffin, “You are wise to make good use of the work of Geerhardus Vos...We who are about to die, salute you!”[11]

Now, regarding Vos and Ridderbos, it will be most helpful to quote Van Til at length at this point, since he speaks quite densely regarding the significance of the Vos-Ridderbos eschatological structure to “the Great Debate,” or, the fundamental apologetic question in The Great Debate Today. Let us keep in mind Dennison’s contention that “For [Van Til]…eschatology concerns only the future, just as it does for Hodge and Berkhof.”[12] Van Til says, with specific regard to the question of the existence of God,

It is of particular interest for us as we conclude our discussion of the great debate today in this chapter, that we note how inextricably Paul’s teaching on eschatology is interwoven with the general principles of his theology. In his book on The Pauline Eschatology, Geerhardus Vos says that to “unfold the Apostle’s eschatology means to set forth his theology as a whole.” Reversing this statement we may add that one cannot set forth Paul’s theology as a whole without indicating that his eschatology is its climax. The entire structure of Paul’s theology may be said to be Christ-centered. Everywhere and always Paul proclaims the self-attesting Christ. By his coming into the world Christ has “abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel” (2 Tm 1:10). It is thus that Paul’s eschatological motif is built into his Christology.

Paul’s preaching of Christ is a preaching of salvation history. “It is controlled,” says Ridderbos, “by that which has happened in Christ, by the acts of God, which he wrought in him for the fulfilment of his plan of salvation, of which the death and resurrection of Christ form the all-important central point.” Ridderbos continues: “Here lies the ground of the whole of his preaching and with the historical reality of this eventuation, in the past as well as in the future the apostolic kerygma stands or falls as the faith of the congregation, 1 Cor: 15:14, 19.”

Still further it is this “historic-eschatological character of Paul’s theology that sets it in organic relation with the Old Testament revelation. What happened in Christ forms the conclusion and fulfilment of a great series of divine acts of Israel and the presupposition of the progress and conclusion of the history of the world.”

Paul sets forth this “all inclusive character of his eschatology” with special fulness in his letters to the Ephesians and to the Colossians. But it is the great presupposition of all of Paul’s preaching…The whole eschatology of Paul is, in the last analysis, controlled by the “acts of God in Christ.”…

“Summing up the matter,” says Ridderbos, “we may say that Paul’s kerygma of the great aeon of salvation that has come in Christ is primarily controlled by the death and resurrection of Christ. It is in this fact that the present age has lost its power and its grasp on the children of Adam and that new things have come. It will therefore appear that the entire unfolding of the salvation that has come in Christ constantly reaches back to his death and resurrection, because all the facets in which this salvation manifests itself, and all the names by which it is indicated are, in the final analysis, nothing else than a breaking through of life in death and of the kingdom of God in the present world.”^[13]

Dennison’s critique of Van Til is shown to be untenable here. Van Til puts Dennison’s entire framework together here in this passage: “It is thus that Paul’s eschatological motif if built into his Christology. Paul’s preaching of Christ is a preaching of salvation history.” We have here Van Til’s explicit requirement that all theological formulation be done with reference to God’s redemptive revelation qualified by its historical and two-age nature. Below, he quotes Ridderbos explicitly mentioning the “great aeon of salvation,” "the present age” losing power, and the “breaking through…of the kingdom of God in the present world.” What more could Dennison ask for? This is Van Til saying, essentially, “If you want to answer the question of the ‘Great Debate,’ reflect fruitfully upon the Vos-Ridderbos interpretation of St. Paul, for a restatement of Reformed theological formulations,” to use Dennison's formula.

Van Til connects the Vos-Ridderbos eschatological framework with apologetics more explicitly, and in his own words, a few pages later, saying,

Jesus shows these Pharisees the absurdity of their view. At the time of the healing of the paralytic, Jesus challenged them to understand Moses and the prophets as speaking of him. Now, in connection with the incident of the healing of the blind and dumb demoniac, Jesus challenges them to see that he did this healing “by the Spirit of God” and that this was evidence of the fact, as he said: “that the kingdom of God has come upon you.” Mt 12:28, RSV

In this new age, in this final age, it is true, more obviously true than before that: “He who is not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me scatters.” Mt 12:30, RSV. Let men then beware! “Therefore, I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven.” Mt 12:31, RSV.

As Paul met the Greeks he met with the same sort of hostility to his message of Christ and the resurrection as Jesus himself met on the part of the Pharisees. What Paul said about Christ, the Greeks argued, could not possibly be true….Accordingly, what Paul said about Christ’s resurrection and about the coming judgment could not possibly be true….If Paul’s message were true they, the Greeks, would have to admit that they were wrong in their view of reality, in their view of knowledge, and in their view of ethics. In short, they would have to admit that they were wrong in their interpretation of everything, and that their wrongness on everything had its root in Satanically inspired hatred of the truth.^[14]

It seems, then, that there is no conflict between Van Til’s apologetic method and the “Vos Ridderbos-Gaffin interpretation of St. Paul.” Let us consider again Dennison’s position. He says, “In a rare point of weakness, Van Til does not follow through with the implications of his thought at this point…It is clearly evident to me that if man is to acquire a proper rational formulation of God’s knowledge, he must submit to the manner in which God rationally reveals Himself to man. God has made Himself rationally understandable through the progressive revelation of Himself in redemptive history. Van Til simply fails to apply his concept of analogy to the historical process of God’s revelation…”[15] This position must be considered, again, based on Van Til’s statements in The Great Debate Today and Gaffin’s statements in “Epistemological Reflections on 1 Corinthians 2:6-16,” untenable.

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[1] William D. Dennison, Paul’s Two-Age Construction and Apologetics (Eugene, Or: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1985), 89-98.

[2] Dennison, Paul’s Two-Age Construction, 92.

[3] Ibid., 94. What is strange about Dennison’s second quote here is that it is from an article by Richard Gaffin which, in the context, has nothing to do with Van Til, and I think that Gaffin would not appreciate his words being used in that way against a man who clearly took seriously the necessity to qualify all systematics with biblical theology. Richard Gaffin, “Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology,” The New Testament Student and Theology, III, (n. p.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1976), 43.

[4] “ Only when it is seen that God’s grace comes to men who are covenant breakers in Adam, to such as were from the outset of history, even when they did not exist, that is when they did not yet exist as historical individuals, already the objects of God’s favorable attitude, that grace is seen truly to be grace.” Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 338; “[The gospel] comes to a generality that has once in common, in one moment, in one man, rejected the offer of eternal life through Adam. Mankind is now, to use the words corresponding to the earlier stage, placed in a way of death.” Common Grace, 81. "It was because in the pactum salutis that Christ took it upon himself to save the world, which would fall into sin and try in vain through its own ethics and its own virtues to save itself, that he now put forth his righteousness as the foundation of the virtues of those who should be in him. The whole question of Jesus' being acquainted with or not being acquainted with Greek ethics is therefore beside the point." Christian Theistic Ethics (den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1971), 12-13.

[5] Dennison, Paul’s Two-Age Construction, 93. Dennison is referencing Van Til’s Introduction to Systematic Theology (Philadelphia, Pa.: Class Syllabus, n.d.), 2.

[6] Ibid., xi.

[7] Richard Gaffin Jr., “Epistemological Reflections on 1 Corinthians 2:6-16,” Revelation and Reason (Phillipsburg, Nj.: Presbyterians and Reformed Publishing, 2007), 14.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 40, fn. 59.

[10] Dennison, Paul’s Two-Age Construction, 96. Dennison says, “Unlike Van Til…Gaffin sees…that eschatology is to be defined not only with reference to the immediate state of individuals following death and to the second coming of Christ but as also inclusive of His first coming and the present existence of the church in the world.”

[11] Van Til, “Response to Richard B. Gaffin Jr. by Cornelius Van Til,” Jerusalem and Athens ed. E. R. Geehan (Phillipsburg, Nj.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1993).

[12] Dennison, Paul’s Two-Age Construction, 90.

^[13] Van Til, The Great Debate Today (Nutley, NJ.: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1970), 170-172. Van Til is here citing from Geerhardus Vos, The Pauline Eschatology (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Eerdmans, 1961), and Herman Ridderbos, Paulus: Ontwerp van Zyn Theologie (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1966). Emphases mine.

^[14] Van Til, The Great Debate Today, 177-178.

[15] Dennison, Paul’s Two-Age Construction, 92.

Biblical Criticism vs. Systematic Theology: A Case for a Higher View of Both

Biblical Studies and Theological Studies have been at war for almost 300 years, both civil, each with tribes within its own borders warring for the throne of definition, method, and object, and interdisciplinary, each fighting over to whom the scepter of Scripture rightfully belongs. For liberalism indeed entered the study of Scripture with Gabler’s address in 1787, yet death reigned from Gabler to Geerhardus Vos, who showed us the types of the one who came. Yet until Vos, biblical studies was a mere glorified historical sociology, being critical of the divine nature of Scripture. In theology, from Calvin to Bavinck to Van Til, God was the principium essendi (essential foundation, as in "essense"), and therefore his revelation as the principium cognescendi (foundation of knowledge) as his revelation in Scripture and creation were the determinative organic foundation for theological studies. From Kant to Schleiermacher to Lindbeck, principia become pretentious, and articulia (articles, or confessions) become the normative sphere of theology.

Now, if principia precede our consideration, and articulia proceed from our consideration, the question we must answer is: “Is systematic theology (henceforth ST) a principium or articuli?” “Does ST come before Scripture or after Scripture?” If it is an articuli, I can criticize it to death if it so pleases my principium. But there must be a principium on the basis of which I criticize it. If I appeal to the authority of Scripture as a principium to justify my criticism of ST (as an articuli), then I must provide a rationalization for its authority that is non-systematic theological by the nature of its critical stance toward ST. On the other hand, if ST is a principium, then it is the foundation for knowledge, and escapes criticism. Principia cannot be criticized, because if one forfeits the authority of a principium, he must either be standing on another principium or has forsaken principia altogether, upon which occasion there is nothing to be critical of. Criticism is allegiance, and allegiance is submission to something.

The biblical theologian will often err by relegating ST to a confessional corner. The systematic theologian will often err by maintaining that ST (as an articuli) is the principium, even for the authority of Scripture. The former is a disregard for principia altogether, and the latter is Roman Catholicism. Where is the resolution?

Bavinck puts it perfectly when he speaks of the divisions of ST: “[T]he order that is theological and at the same time historical-genetic in character deserves preference. It, too, takes its point of departure in God and views all creatures only in relation to him. But proceeding from God, it descends to his works, in order through them again to ascend to and end in him. So in this method as well, God is beginning, middle, and end.” (1:112) For Bavinck, then, there is an ordo theologia. It begins with God as the principium essendi (“it...takes its point of departure in God and views all creatures only in relation to him”), proceeds from that to the inerrant scriptures (and therein biblical theology as redemptive history) as the principium cognescendi (“it descends to his works, in order through them again to ascend to and end in him”), and ends with ST occurring again, but as an articuli fidei. And so, ST is “from Him and through Him and to Him” (Rom. 11:36).

My hope in writing this is that students of Scripture might finally take a stand for ST. Too often, lip service to ST as a bunch of “necessary theological presuppositions,” conceived of as mere articuli only, passes for an exegete’s Christian duty, fulfilled to let the big boys do the heavy interpretive lifting. Quite the contrary, the only reason that ST as an articuli means anything is because ST as principium essendi is the foundation for Scripture as principium cognescendi. Too often, we hear the rally cry “Sola Scriptura” by those who forget that (1) “Sola Scripture” is an interpretive tradition, and (2) “Sola Scriptura” is one of five “Solas,” perhaps the most important, and most hermeneutically relevant, being “Solus Christus” (not “Solo Christo”). Scripture is not the ultimate principium. God as the principium essendi is the ultimate principium, and to honor Him, the progressive nature of the principium cognescendi must not be seen as warrant to rip it out of the hands of God himself, to separate the two.

More particularly and simply, Scripture is either inspired by God and inerrant, or not inspired and impossible to understand. The fact that some evangelical scholars today reject inerrancy blows my mind. Hear this clearly: If you see Scripture as a problem to fix, you will never fix it. There are too many possible historical reconstructions, text-critical issues, form-critical developments, source-critical contradictions, and, plainly, too many historical, literary, sociological, and ideological weeds between the reader and God, in which case either (1) God is an incompetent communicator and has not provided men the sufficient means to be learned unto salvation, or (2) God does something extra scriptura in which case we encounter God through Scripture, but not as though the words themselves are inspired (Barth, contemporary TI movement), which takes its legs out from under itself by saying “There is no principium cognescendi, only the principium essendi,” in which case interpreters are wasting their time. Bavinck rightly asserts, “The foundations of faith (principia fidei) are themselves articles of faith (articuli fidei), based not on human arguments and proofs but divine authority.” (1:109)

Regarding inerrancy, then, Scripture is either our principium cognescendi or it is not. Contemporary trends in theology like to settle into whatever word of Rom. 11:36 fits them best, whether it is “from Him” (only essendi, Barth), “through Him” (only cognescendi, rejection of inerrancy), or “to Him” (only articuli, Frei, Lindbeck), when in reality, God calls us through Christ to accept all three (John 17:13-19) and believe that Scripture is God’s holy, inspired, and therefore inerrant word given for us Solus Christus.

Fantasizing and the Glory of God

We fantasize a lot. From grandiose Hollywood productions of “[Insert name]: The Most Kick-Ass Person Who Ever Lived” to microsecond-long vacations from reality to a world we make in our own minds. A world where we get a little more appreciation for the day-to-day things we do. A world where things go our way.

But does fantasizing bring glory to God? There seems to be a fundamental mutual exclusivity between the two. Someone might say, “Yes! I dream about doing great things for God!” I’m not talking about godly ambitions for the future. Fantasizing is the best present manifestation of our present desires we can muster when our desires aren’t met in reality. Someone might still say, “I can fantasize about my present desire for God to be glorified being manifested in the present.” But let’s be honest. (1) How many of our fantasies are about God getting all the glory? (2) Paul says, “So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God.” (1 Cor. 10:31) So, if God is glorified in the most menial tasks of life, there is no need for fantasy, because our desire for God to be glorified is met in our desiring that he be glorified in everything in reality. He is really glorified in the lowliest and most insignificant daily tasks. Breathing. Blinking. Eating. To him. His glory is real, not fantastical.

The point is that our fantasies are our “quiet-times” devoted to ourselves. They are prayers that our wills would be done, whether God likes it or not, in reality to some degree as it is in our crooked hearts. In fantasies the world goes to the greatest lengths to satisfy our will for our own glory; in reality, we all we need to do is “set [our] minds on the things that are above [where Christ is, sitting at the right hand of God]” (Col. 3:2,[1b]), because the promise is that the glory of Christ is real and those thoughts will be shown to be real on the last day, for “when Christ, who is [our] life appears, then [we] also will appear with him in glory.” (3:4) Our fantasies will never appear in glory; to set our minds on Christ is not to fantasize, for it is to set our minds on the true one (Titus 1:2), who is the only glorious one (Rom. 11:36), is to know His fantasy, which is reality (Rom. 11:33-36; 1 Cor. 2:11-16).

To close, we know that God knows our thoughts (even our fantasies; “Even before a word is on my tongue, behold, O LORD, you know it altogether.” Psalm 139:4), but the question we need to ask ourselves is: “Do we know God in our thoughts? Or do we only know ourselves?” Do we finish the Psalm as David does, praying, “Search me, O God, and know my heart! Try me and know my thoughts! And see if there be any grievous way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting.” (139:23-24)? When we “be” (as Zuber puts it), do we “be” in God’s world under the covenant of Grace, or do we “be” with one foot in reality and one foot in a fantastical world where we are the hero? Where we deserving. Where we have rights. Where we are the creators. Do we have a place we’ve created where we can escape to and say with the Trainman, “Here, I make the rules. Here, I’m God.”

Why Stuff Means Stuff (Previously “Why Reader’s Response Hermeneutics Destroys the Reader”)

There are certain categories which designate the roles of the entities of the hermeneutical drama. An author creates the meaning. The text is the means by which the author formulates, articulates, and communicates the meaning. The reader is the one who receives the meaning.

Now, any number of Reader Response (RR) interpretive theories might say: “By defining a reader as a mere receptor, you have already stacked the methodological deck in your favor!” Perhaps. But I’m not the one who stacked the deck. The hermeneutical mechanism existed before me, and according to my God, finds its origin in the very mind of the Trinity (John 1:1-3; Col. 1:15-20; John 17:7-8).

However, here is the reason why it’s okay to designate these specific definitions to these specific words: They don’t mean anything to begin with! “Reader” just means someone who encounters a “text,” which, according to Hirsch, can be more than just words, and is, in fact, the entire world! And so, if the entire world is a text, and Schleiermacher’s literary and psychological hermeneutical circles propose that every author is just reorganizing material from the text of his language and experience, then there is no difference between an author and a reader! A reader is just a consciousness that encounters a reorganized text, which is exactly what the author had to do with his language, location, experience, conceptual categories, etc. In the conversation of philosophical hermeneutics, at the bare-bottom level of semantics, in the philosophical-hermeneutical discussion, there is no difference between the author and the reader! There are only “text-encounterers.” Therefore, I have every right define “author,” “reader,” “text,” context,” “cotext,” or anything else however I want to, because it has been done so poorly by everyone in the conversation!

IF YOU DON’T WANT TO READ THIS WHOLE THING, JUST SKIP TO THIS PART.

In the “reader-response” hermeneutical in-crowd (I’m not just talking Derrida and Foucault; I’m talking Jewish, Liberation, Feminist, Post-colonial, etc.), by prioritizing the “reader” above the “author,” according to the definitions layed out above, and also demonstrated in the ambiguity of their own terms, there is no such thing as a reader! If it is up to the reader to determine the meaning of the text, he BECOMES the author. If it is just a “meaning in the text,” then the hermeneutical scholar who determines the rules for finding the meaning becomes the author!

My point is that these basic semantics of the hermeneutical conversation explicate the true nature of most philosophical-hermeneutical views. If they are RR, they actually UNDERMINE what a reader really is, and create a world with only authors. This is significant because the very question that started the RR movement was the authority of the author over the meaning of the text! So RR actually comes full circle back to authorial intent. Although they would not say that each "reader" (author in denial) determines any sort of single meaning, in the RR hermeneutic, he is designated authority, and does act pseudo-authorially in his approach to text, and therefore, by converting his receptivity into “authority,” he forfeits the very thing (receptivity) that makes him a reader.

I’m not making a case for a positivist approach to hermeneutics. Jut demonstrating that philosophy is actually a lot easier than it looks, and once basic words have basic definitions, “complicated” philosophical views are shown to be very basic and obviously incoherent.

Final Remarks: I’m not saying that there is not a subjective element to hermeneutics. There certainly is. When we distinguish between sense (meaning, origination), application (instantiation, manifestation), and import (the maintaining of the consistent correspondence between meaning and instantiation), there is room for the objective and the subjective. However, this note is WAY too long already, because you are already tired of reading it. Final challenge to all of us:

Have an understanding of language and hermeneutics that accounts for these theological phenomena:

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.” –John 1:1-3 (There was not a grammatical or historical context from which or into which God spoke the words of creation, yet the reader—material creation—perfectly responded to the precise intention of God’s mind, the sole determiner of the nature of created reality).

“Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our fathers by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world. He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power.” –Heb. 1:1-3 (To know Christ is to accept the Father’s interpretation of himself; how could we “read in” pre-conceived notions of a category which would be entirely unknown to us except by God’s revelation itself?)

“For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and of spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart. And no creature is hidden from his sight, but all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we must give account.” –Heb. 4:12-13 (God effectively instantiates His objective word in the heart of the reader)